

Kazimierz Twardowski: a great teacher of great philosophers

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Abstract. Kazimierz Twardowski was the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, one of the greatest phenomena in the European culture. The School had its representatives in all scientific disciplines, logic and mathematics including. Among his pupils are such great figures of European philosophy like: Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Władysław Tatar-kiewicz and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. The paper presents his life and various fields of his rich activity, as well as the list of his main works and the greatest achievements in philosophy. He is best known in the world as the author of the distinction presentation-object-content, act-product, as well as the supporter of the postulate of clarity of thought and speech and the critic of psychologism, relativity of truth, symbolomania and pragmatophobia in science.

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Who really is a patriot, is not hungry for fame.
His inner conviction is enough for him,
that he makes what he should make,
and none of his effort will be wasted;
his sweat and – when it is needed – his blood
produces the most beautiful and most wonderful seeds:
the greatness and happiness of the Fatherland.

On patriotism (Twardowski [7, p.454])

1. Life

He was born on October 20, 1886, in Vienna; he died on February 11, 1938 in Lvov.

After several years of education at home and in public school, Twardowski, through the efforts of his father, obtained a place in a prestigious high school in Vienna – *Theresianum*. This school provided him with a comprehensive classical education; in *Theresianum*, he was also familiar with philosophical problems. Thanks to the iron discipline prevailing in the school, Twardowski got accustomed to systematic, persistent work – and thanks to the example instilled in him at home, from an early age he wanted to serve Poland and the Poles.

After graduating from *Theresianum* Twardowski began his studies at the University of Vienna, initially at the Faculty of Law. For some time he lived at the property of Earl Wojciech Dzieduszycki in Jezupol where he was teaching the children of the earl. Perhaps partly due to Dzieduszycki – a philosopher, a politician and a writer – with whom he had cordial relations, Twardowski moved to the philosophical faculty. Studying philosophy, he was influenced to the greatest degree by Franz Brentano – who became for Twardowski the model of a teacher and a researcher.

After graduating Twardowski performed annual military service. The doctoral degree he earned in 1891 was based on a dissertation on the views of Descartes. The official promoter of this work was Robert Zimmermann (at this time, Brentano could not officially be a promoter of any doctorate).

In 1892, Twardowski married Kazimiera Kołodziejska, with whom he had three daughters: Helena, Aniela and Maria. All were well-educated, and the youngest of them married Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, one of Twardowski's closest disciples.

Thanks to a scholarship from the Austrian Government, in 1892 Twardowski traveled to Leipzig and Munich. After returning to Vienna, he took a job as an official, so that he could earn money as a tutor while preparing his habilitation. He received it in 1894 for the thesis *Zur Lehre und Gegenstand der Inhalt der Vorstellung*. This dissertation was, until recently, the most famous of Twardowski's works, since it was published in German. After obtaining habilitation, in the academic year 1894/1895, Twardowski taught in Vienna as a Privatdozent.

As early as the next year, thanks to a happy coincidence, as the only 29-year-old scholar, Twardowski took over the chair of philosophy at the University of Lvov. Twardowski quickly proved to be an equally charismatic teacher, like his Viennese master. Twardowski remained faithful to the University of Lvov, working there until retirement, i.e. until 1930, and after that he continued to take part in its life.

2. Personality

He was one of the most important and most versatile characters of Polish culture of the first half of the twentieth century.

As a scholar, he was the author of excellent work from all the areas of philosophy – from logic, through ontology and epistemology, to aesthetics and ethics – and also works on its history, on psychology and on didactics; he also composed

songs full of expression, most of which were unfortunately lost during the turmoil of the wars.

As a teacher, he was a master of several generations of Polish philosophers and, more broadly, humanists.

As a citizen, he set the tone of the teaching environment, presiding, in the first decade of the twentieth century, over the influential Society of Teachers of Higher Education and leading an extensive lifelong correspondence with many opinion-forming representatives of the country. Thanks to cautious, but firm and persistent action, he led, among other things, to fully repolonizing education in the Austrian partition of Poland.

For the elementary component of citizenship he felt patriotism. The latter – understood as an actually active attitude – Twardowski distinguished from ceremonial patriotism. A ceremonial patriot has a sentimental attitude to his country and nation, gladly manifesting this attitude on certain occasions. However, he can not afford to sacrifice his own good for the good of his countrymen.

3. Writings

The most important of Twardowski's book publications published in his lifetime – are: *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* [1], *Imageries and concepts* [3], *The essential concepts of didactics and logic* [4], *Six lectures on medieval philosophy* [5], *Addresses and papers* [6] and *Philosophical dissertations and papers* [9].

After his death the following appeared: *Selected philosophical writings* [10], *Collected psychological and pedagogical writings* [11], *Ethics* [12], *Diaries*. Vol. I–II [13], *Philosophy and music* [15], *Youthful diaries* [16] and *Thought, speech and action*. Vol. I–II [17].

In English, the following of Twardowski's books were published, i.a.: *On the content and object of presentations* [1], *On actions, products and other topics in philosophy* [14] and *On prejudices, judgments and other topics in philosophy* [18].

4. Views

It is often said that the greatness of Twardowski lies exclusively in his organizational and pedagogical activities: in particular, that he was the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Such an assessment is given even by many representatives of the School itself.

However, it should be kept in mind that only some of the philosophical views of Twardowski were expressed in print during his lifetime. In this case, Twardowski was like his master – Franz Brentano.

This involved, among others, the fact that Twardowski not only preached, but also realized, to the highest degree, the postulate of accuracy and precision. Anyone who obeys this postulate – knows how difficult it is to give final form to

our own thoughts. Twardowski severely judged those who lacked awareness of this situation:

How many authors publish philosophical papers, essays, and even extensive volumes, which directly swarming with equivocations, incomprehensibilities, thoughts, hopes, inconsistencies, vague expressions and paralogisms, and who, together with their publishers, loses nothing, provoking sound and often admiration in wide reading circles! I could envy them the ease of their literary production; but, in fact, I underestimate the products of their pens and I resent their behavior which is highly detrimental to the logical development of philosophical thinking [8, p.32].

Meanwhile, an analysis of even only the printed legacy of Twardowski shows that he has won important theoretical results in all disciplines of philosophy. Here we have an outline of these results.

4.1. Metaphilosophy

4.1.1. Philosophy and worldview. Twardowski regarded philosophy as a conglomerate of disciplines, which consists of logic, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics and the history of philosophy. He pointed also to a particular trait of all philosophical disciplines: the objects of philosophical research are given in internal experience (introspection).

The word “philosophy” is sometimes used as a synonym for the word “worldview”. Twardowski’s postulate was separating philosophical problems, cultivated with scientific methods, from the problems of a worldview, whose field is one of personal beliefs; giving the latter the form of a theory which he considered pure speculation.

In Twardowski’s relation to faith – we need to distinguish its relationship to the Catholic dogma, to Catholic ethics and Catholic ceremony. As for the first and second case, Twardowski wanted, in Christianity, a dominance of the ethical dimension over – let us call it so – the dogmatic.

4.1.2. Brightness of language. One of the main causes of errors in philosophy, he recognized, is the lack of clarity of thought, coupled closely with the lack of clarity of speech; the lack of clarity of speech can at the same time be regarded as a symptom of the lack of clarity of thought, as discursive thinking can not be extralinguistic.

Accordingly, philosophical terminology required reconstruction. In this reconstruction, he recommended using the analytical method (which was also used by him). Such a reconstruction is carried out in two stages. The first stage is to examine the essential properties of several typical designates of a given term and to formulate its analytical definition. In the second stage this definition is adjusted by checking whether the analytical theses implicated by this definition are true for other designata of the defined term.

Twardowski advocated the careful use of formal logic in the analysis of philosophical problems: he was the enemy of (as he expressed it) symbolomania, i.e. abusing logical symbolism, and of pragmatophobia, related to the first, i.e. focusing our attention on the syntactic aspects of this symbolism. For logical structures – including those that are formally flawless – are not always based on well defined intuitions, and these structure do not often have any model in the field of philosophical studies.

4.1.3. Independence of thought. Twardowski was a firm defender of the independence of thought.

In his opinion, our beliefs are often dependent on: those deemed by us to be authorities; the environment in which we live; the language we use; our mental organization and finally, our emotions.

To the question of whether we can think independently, Twardowski responds in a complex way. There are things or domains, in which we all are doomed to be – more or less – dependent in thinking; however, some of us, in some cases, can think independently. Independence of thought is therefore an ideal which – according to Twardowski – we ought to and, which is important, we are able to pursue successfully.

4.1.4. Anti-psychologism. Twardowski regarded logic and psychology to be propaedeutic disciplines of philosophy. Earlier, however, he had rejected the psychologism prevailing at the time of his youth, i.e. the view, according to which, logic is a part of psychology or should rely upon it.

Psychologism was, according to Twardowski, untenable for the following reasons: (1) logic was created and developed independently of psychology; (2) theses in psychology (which are generalizations of experimental data) are only probable, whereas theses in logic are reliable (and, consequently, unquestionable), and being reliable, they can not follow psychological theses; (3) psychology is the theory of the actual activity of thinking – whereas logic deals with evaluating the typical forms of the products of thinking (i.e. thoughts) in terms of their accuracy.

4.2. Metaphysics

Twardowski never disavowed metaphysics as such, but he had a very rigorous view of the conditions that must be met by philosophical research, if their results could be included in scientific knowledge. However, he did not share the (positivist) belief that since the object of study of metaphysics – and wider, in philosophy – is neither the world of sensual phenomena, nor the world of mental phenomena, it is not science. The idea is that outside these phenomena there are still objects of another type (e.g. relationships) – and they are examined in, among other disciplines, metaphysics in a manner adopted in other sciences, in particular, by describing these objects and using inductive and deductive reasoning to define and justify statements about these objects, just as in the natural sciences.

At the same time, Twardowski was a supporter of the cumulative conception of philosophy. The long-term goal of philosophy is to construct a synthesis of the

scientific theories which would be the theory of all objects (and not only a theory of sensual or mental phenomena); such a synthesis has still not been achieved, but its elements already exist and we should patiently seek others. For, according to Twardowski, it is better to accept no synthesis at all – than to accept a fallacious one.

4.2.1. Anti-psychologism. We owe to Twardowski a developed theory of objects, formulated, by the way, before Alexius Meinong.

According to Twardowski, each object – regardless of its existential and metaphysical category – is a homogeneous whole, composed of various properties. The components of objects are whatever can be distinguished in these objects: a particular component is something that can be distinguished in fact; a component of the abstract is something that can be distinguished only intentionally. All properties of objects and all relationships between the parts of these objects are abstract components. For example, the stem and thorns of a certain rose are its concrete components, whereas its redness and its being-a-plant are its abstract components.

4.2.2. Categorization of objects. As one of their tasks, metaphysicians always sought to make a categorization of objects. However, few of them realized this goal in a logically satisfactory way, such that these categorizations took the form of logically correct classifications; fortunately Twardowski belonged to this smaller group.

He carried out logically correct classifications of objects based on different existential aspects and different ontic aspects. In the first case, he found three dichotomous classifications: into possible and impossible objects, into existing and non-existing objects, and into real and unreal objects. In the second case: into individual and general objects, into simple and complex objects, as well as into corporal and spiritual objects. This made it possible to recognize the traditional categorizations as the result of not fully intentionally crossing the classifications made by Twardowski.

4.2.3. Actions and product. An important step on the way to Twardowski rejecting psychologism, was his analysis of actions and the products of actions.

Actions are states of a special type. They are associated with certain specific objects, which he called “products”: and so a picture is the product of painting (or drawing), an inscription is the product of writing, a thought is the product of thinking, *etc.* Among the artifacts, there are relatively unstable products, which can be distinguished from the corresponding actions only mentally (*scil.* by abstraction), and relatively stable products. A jump is an unstable product of jumping and a dance is an unstable product of dancing. A picture as a product of painting, a hole as a product of digging – are relatively stable products of their relevant actions.

Products of physical actions – i.e. physical products – are either unstable (e.g. a cry as a product of crying, a jump as a product of jumping, a rotation as a product of rotating) or stable (e.g. a print as a product of printing, a braid as a product of braiding). Stable products of physical actions exist more than

the actions by which they arise. However, all the products of mental actions – i.e. mental products – are unstable (e.g. a thought as a product of thinking, an experience as a product of experiencing, a decision as the product of deciding).

Some actions are directed at certain objects. Objects – especially things – at which physical actions are directed, create the material (*scil.* basis) of these actions (e.g. sand, which reflects the rate of person walking along this sand).

The product of a mental action directed at a certain material is not a material itself, but is a new structure of this material (created by this action). The object, at which a certain mental action is directed, is the object of this action (e.g. a landscape imagined by someone). Actions that are directed at something – are intentional actions.

Certain properties of products are not properties of the actions that create these products. For example – it happens that we are dreaming something that is false, but the dream itself is not false; a question may be confusing, but it can be the confusing action of asking a question.

Twardowski made a distinction of actions and the contents of presentations in terms of actions and products. He considered stable products to be psychophysical objects; he identified cultural artifacts just with such objects.

4.2.4. The soul. Twardowski proposed an original approach to the problem of the ontological status of the soul.¹

According to Twardowski, the thesis about the existence of the soul – as a substratum of experiences – is an obvious thesis and as such it does not need any proof. An opponent to this thesis – an asubstantialist – could not use the pronoun “I” in the ordinary sense of this pronoun. The so-called group of mental phenomena, which is identified by asubstantialists with “I”, would not be able to determine that a given experience belongs just to it (a similar difficulty would arise with any internal perception); for a similar reason, this group would not say of itself that it knows something.

Twardowski justified the thesis of the simplicity of the soul in such a way. If a substratum of experiences consisted of parts, and some two experiences (e.g. a visual and an auditory impression) were located in two different parts of the substratum, it would not be possible to compare them; meanwhile, such a comparison is a fact. Since the soul is simple (*scil.* it is a mental atom), it is eternal, because its possible creation or annihilation can not be naturally explained. It remains to be assumed that the natural eternity of souls-atoms goes hand in hand with the fact that they are created by God (creating any objects by an eternal God does not require that that they occurred later in time than God – and thus were non-eternal) and at one moment (e.g. at the moment of the birth of a human being) are revealed in the temporal-spatial world.

The thesis of the simplicity of the soul is one of the premises of reasoning justifying the thesis of the immortality of the soul. The second premise is the principle

¹Twardowski’s views concerning this subject are little known. Only recently was his extensive German manuscript from 1895 published. Cf. [1].

of conservation of energy – taken from the natural sciences. While Twardowski was aware of certain imperfections of his reasoning, he considered it to be conclusive.

4.3. Psychology and epistemology

Standing on the position of anti-psychologism – Twardowski devoted much of his attention to psychological and meta-psychological considerations, with respect to considerations bordering on psychology, epistemology and methodology. Until the end of his life, he believed that psychology is the basic philosophical discipline due to the fact that it is the theory of (real) thinking.

Twardowski practiced empirical psychology, i.e. psychology that justifies its statements on the basis of experience – unlike, for example, political history, whose tested facts (as past) need to be reconstructed on the basis of indirect data, i.e. testimonies, and «natural» history, when investigating the history of certain fragments of nature. At the same time, empirical psychology appeals to external experience (*scil.* extraspection) and internal experience (*scil.* introspection), introspection being its ultimate foundation. So psychology may be considered a quasi-historical science: lying on the border of empirical and historical disciplines – wherein some fields of psychology are closer to the first (as e.g. examining the psyche of healthy people), and some to the others (as e.g. psychiatry).

4.3.1. Components of consciousness. Experiential components of consciousness – mental facts – are spiritual actions (which can be only mentally separated from each other) and their products. The source of knowledge concerning psychic facts cannot be located in the senses, but rather self-consciousness. In such a direct way, only states of our own consciousness are knowable.

The basic kind of spiritual action is presenting something for the substratum of these actions. It is a necessary condition for all other – secondary – types of spiritual actions, in particular: judging, reasoning (or “pondering, hesitating, comparing, devising, synthesizing, distinguishing *etc.*”), feeling and deciding. On the other hand, judging is a necessary condition of feeling – in any case convictional feeling – and deciding.

Twardowski thought, at the same time, that presenting and judging are kinds of thinking; this is suggested, among other things, by the fact, that there are two contexts of the word “to think”, namely: “to think of X ”, and “to think that p ”. To think of X – is the same as – to present X (*scil.* to imagine or comprehend), and to think that p – is the same as – to judge that p . One of the kinds of thinking is also reasoning, which – according to Twardowski – is judging about judgments.

Both primary and secondary spiritual actions are intentional actions: they require an object.

The spiritual conditions of spiritual actions are dispositions. Dispositions are only hypothetical components of consciousness. According to the law of practice, it is assumed that the occurrence of any mental fact leaves a disposition to reproduce it.

4.3.2. Components of consciousness. The legitimacy, which Twardowski permanently secured in the history of European philosophy, was in carrying a precise delimitation of the three aspects of presentation: act, content (i.e. – as he put it – the product of action) and object. Twardowski accepted this distinction throughout all his scientific activity, but he made some modifications to the original conception of this distinction.

Act and content of presentation are the metaphysical (*scil.* abstract) parts of presentation. In languages, presentations correspond to names; the content of presentations corresponds to the meaning of names, and the object of presentations – to what names designate.

The object of a given presentation is different from the content of this presentation, because: (a) when we perform a negative judgment of the type “*A*-being-*B* does not exist”, then we deny the existence of the object *A*-being-*B* given in presentation, which forms the basis of the performed judgment, but, at the same time, we realize that the content of this presentation contains something (namely *B*), which means that the object of this presentation does not exist in reality; (b) there are various presentations of the same object (i.e. we can imagine the same *A*, in one time, as *P*, and in another time, as *Q*). The expression “presented object” is ambiguous; it may refer (in the determining meaning) to a real object, which is presented by someone – or (in the modifying meaning) to the mental presentation of this real object.

Twardowski divided presentations into images (*scil.* concrete, pictorial presentations) and concepts (*scil.* abstract, non-pictorial presentations). At the same time, he distinguished perceptive images – from reconstructive (memory-based) and productive (based on imagination) images. The difference between them is qualitative rather than only quantitative. Perceptive presentations – unlike reconstructive and productive ones – are more vivid and independent of our will.

Twardowski defined concepts as presentations consisting of a vague underlying image and presented judgments which assign to the object of this image properties constituting the connotation of the expression with which this concept is linked.

By virtue of their object – concepts can be divided into synthetic and analytic. Objects of synthetic concepts are things or persons (e.g. the concept of a tree, of a kingdom, of God). The underlying image of a synthetic concept is the (reconstructive or productive) image of an object similar to the one that has to be conceptualized. One of the components creating the content of a given concept is an image of the statement stating that the object of the underlying image has properties, which *de facto* are not possessed by this object.

Both types of concepts – i.e. synthetic and analytic – have two forms: proper and shortened, *scil.* hemisymbolic or symbolic. In the hemisymbolic form, the act of conceptualizing contains the image of the name designating the object of this concept and the accurate underlying image. In the symbolic form, there is only the first component (*scil.* the image of a name).

4.3.3. Judgments. The starting point in the theory of judgments was to Twardowski the idiogenic conception of judgment. According to this conception, judging is recognizing or rejecting the existence of a certain object.² Just as within the domain of presentations, Twardowski distinguished, in the case of judgments, content and the object of it. The object of a judgment – is what we recognize as existing or reject as non-existing. The content of a positive judgment is the existence of the object, the content of an appropriate negative judgment is the non-existence of the object. Each judgment is a superstructure on an underlying presentation. The underlying presentations of judgments have an existential paraphrase as in the judgments “There is a city where Kazimierz Twardowski was born” and “There is a city where the peace conference was held after the Napoleonic wars”, which have the same object: the city of Vienna. These judgments are different because they are different as to the content of their underlying presentation: in the first case, Vienna is presented as a city which is the birthplace of Kazimierz Twardowski; in the second case – as a city where the peace conference was held after the Napoleonic wars.

Twardowski noticed, however, that the traditional idiogenic theory encounters some difficulties – especially, e.g., in the case of judgments on past objects as well as in the case of judgments about relationships.

The problem of judgments about a future object was reconstructed by Twardowski as follows. Consider the judgment “There was a king”. Brentano would interpret this judgment as acceptance of the existence of a past king. However, if “to be” means the same as “to be now”, and “past king” designates such a king who was formerly and now is gone – then we are in contradiction: because we receive the judgment “There is something that once existed, but no longer exists”.

Twardowski sketched therefore a modification of the theory judgment, avoiding the identified difficulties. He contrasts in it two types of judgments: the existential and the relational, the term “existential judgment” coming from the content, and the term “relational judgment” coming from the object of presentation. The content of existential judgment is namely existence, and the object of relational judgment – wherein the term “relationship” was used by Twardowski in the meaning similar to that, in which the term “state of affairs” is used today. In relational judgment, a certain relationship is accepted or rejected, and the content of such a judgment is subsistence (Germ. *vorhandensein Bestehen*). In this case, the overall form of judgment is: $\pm bA$, where ‘ \pm ’ means the acceptance or the rejection, ‘ b ’

²In Twardowski, we find a characteristic hesitation, which will be also visible in many of his disciples: either a logical value should be considered a defining property of “judgment”, or “judgment” should be defined without using the notion of truth with respect to falsehood. Here we are dealing with the second solution. But sometimes Twardowski called “judgment” a mental action, “in which truth or falsehood is contained”. This involves “truth” and “falsehood” in the proper sense. The external criterion of truthfulness understood in such a manner is conformity with the truth, and of falsehood – fallacy. The internal criterion is whether “true” and “false” are adjectives determining nouns (and thus they are determinators), where they stand – or adjectives which retain the changed sense of those nouns (and thus – in the latter case – they are modifiers).

– subsistence, and ‘A’ – an appropriate relationship. The characteristic fact here is the presence of the difference between the judgments: “God exists” and “There was a king”. While the content of the first judgment is the existence of God, the content of the second is the subsistence of a relationship of possession taking place between a certain king and a preceding period (or otherwise: the subsistence of a relationship of possession occurring between a certain king and the property of being contemporary with some past period).

4.3.4. Truth and error. Twardowski gave convincing arguments in favor of alethic absolutism, showing that relativists, supposing that the logical value of judgments may vary in time and space, have in mind *de facto* not judgments, but rather their imperfect language expressions which are rarely reliable sentences. For example, maintaining that the judgment that it is raining is relatively true, since it is true only in certain circumstances – is a misunderstanding. When we say “It is raining” – we express the judgment that it is raining at such and not another place and at such and not another time, and the judgment that it is raining in these and not other circumstances is absolutely true or absolutely false.

Twardowski devoted a lot of attention to the analysis of prejudices.

Prejudice, according to Twardowski, is a false belief, asserting the occurrence of a certain regularity – a belief which is supported by someone without sufficient justification. Twardowski distinguished two particular kinds of prejudices: superstitions and survivals. A superstition is a prejudice concerning the accuracy occurring between natural and supranatural phenomena. In contrast, survival is a prejudice which was once common but its detailing is not a prejudice.

4.4. Semiotics

4.4.1. Functions of speech. According to Twardowski – language is a double instrument by the fact that particular language signs perform a dual representative function (*scil.* functions of expressing) in the face of spiritual actions (primarily, in the face of emotional-volitional actions; secondarily, in the face of intellectual actions): objective and subjective functions.

Objective functions – significative and denotative ones – rely in turn on the fact that a language sign signifies a product of represented spiritual actions and designates the object of these actions. Subjective functions – indicative and evocative ones – rely in turn on the fact that a language sign indicates an action on the part of the sender of this sign and inspires action in its recipient; the matter here is about actions, the products of which are meant by this sign. It is thanks to the indicative function that the language signs (of natural speech) may indicate, among other things, emotional shades (*scil.* emotional moments), marked not only in the choice of vocabulary (cf. e.g. a pair of words: “nag” – “horse”, “to give up the ghost” – “to die”,³ the first positions of which are occupied by the words of a specific color), but also in the manner of pronouncing words. On the other hand,

³In this paper, all examples come from Twardowski himself.

it is thanks to the evocative function, that language signs can be understood at all.

Twardowski notes that language signs are usually ambiguous. The same kind of sign can have several logical meanings (e.g.: “my portrait” may mean the same as “a portrait done by myself”, “a portrait, which belongs to me” or “portrait, which presents me”). Speech features also multinominality. One type of thinking corresponds sometimes with many kinds of words of speech.

Ambiguity and multinominality speak against a parallelism between speaking and thinking; and the fact that we can speak without thinking and we can think without speaking (also continuously – as it is, for example, in the case of dumb men) speaks against the identity of speaking and thinking. But there is a strong correlation between speaking and thinking. Firstly, signs of speech – as symbols of corresponding thoughts – remain in a causal relationship with them. Secondly, in thinking – especially more abstract thinking – there are numerous «shortened» concepts (*scil.* hemisymbolic and symbolic concepts, as mentioned above). Thirdly, the relationship between thinking and speaking means that someone thinking vaguely cannot clearly express their thoughts.

The set of language signs has two subsets: sentences and parts of sentences. The latter can in turn be presenting or cathegorematic signs, or connecting or syncathegorematic signs. Cathegorematic signs perform representative functions in relation to presentations – they mean something; syncathegorematic signs are only co-meaning. Typical cathegoremata are names; typical syncathegoremata are connectors.

4.4.2. Names. Of the grammatical parts of speech, names tend to generally be proper nouns (e.g.: “Lvov”, “Stanislaus Augustus”) and common nouns (e.g.: “father”, “soul”), pronouns (e.g.: “he”, “we”, “something”), adjectives (e.g.: “white”, “gloomy”), numerals (e.g.: “two”, “tenth”, “fifty seven and a half”) and verbs (e.g.: “to run”, “to learn”, “to expire”) – namely those which are grammatical subjects (except sentences deprived of a predicate), predicates (except sentences deprived of a subject), predicatives or complements of simple sentences. Names may be not only single nouns, but also whole noun phrases, and therefore fusions of nouns with other expressions (e.g.: “human eye”, “this man”, “a man”, “the second son”, “the highest mountain in Europe”, “the son who insulted his father”).

According to Twardowski – as there are no objectless presentations, so too are there no empty names: each name designates a certain entity – and exactly one entity (even a complex name). On the other hand, the fact that a given object is designated does not imply the existence of this object.

4.4.3. Declaratives. Among sentences, Twardowski distinguished not only expressions representing judgments, but also those representing orders, wishes, requests, questions or curses.

He called sentences representing judgments – “declaratives”. A declarative means the frame of a given judgment (*scil.* existence); it designates the object of

this judgment; it indicates a judging performed by the speaker and raises performing – or only presenting (and thus understanding) – the judgment by the listener. Moreover, not every declarative can be described as a “sentence” in the grammatical sense (cf. e.g. the word “Fire!”, representing sometimes the judgment that it is burning).

A special type of declaratives are definitional formulas of the structure “ A is (identical with) B ” (e.g. “ A state is a public community which includes a sedentary population within a given territory as a community of rulers and the ruled”). These declaratives do not de facto represent the judgments that A is (identical with) B (especially in the example, given above, we claim nothing about a state), but rather judgments, that ‘ A ’ designates B (in particular we claim in this definition that by the word “state” we designate a certain object, whose representation has been constructed in this way).

Truthfulness, as well as evidence and probability – and their inverses – could be assigned to declaratives only indirectly: due to judgments represented by them. Absolute truthfulness is namely possessed by a declarative representing only true judgments. Such declaratives should be complete ones. About a declarative which sometimes represents true judgment and sometimes wrong, we can say that it is relatively true. Among such declaratives, there are elliptical declaratives (e.g.: “It is raining”, “A cold bath is a healthy thing”, “Apartments in Lvov are expensive”). Similarly, if talking about synonymy in relation to judgments is ridiculous, so much is it so in relation to declaratives. Namely, two declaratives are synonymous when they represent the same judgment.

4.4.4. Connectors. According to Twardowski, among *lato sensu* connectors, a special place is occupied by determinators, i.e. nouns, pronouns, adjectives, adverbs and numerals – and the phrases equivalent to them – which occur in attributive contexts (e.g.: “speed OF MOTION”, the “father OF SOCRATES”, “the gable wall OF a HOUSE”, “THIS man”, “A man”, “NO man”). In predicative contexts, they are *cathegoremata*.

A determinator – together with the name for which it stands, co-represents the presentation of a judgment relating to the object designated by the determined expression. Depending on the subject of this judgment, an ascriptive function is performed by a determinator in relation to a given determined expression, consisting in determination, abolition, confirmation or modification (i.e. both abolition and determination). The determining and abolishing function consists in changing the meaning and, in particular, either in its enrichment (cf. “good man”), or its depletion (cf. “alleged shape”). The confirming function consists in strengthening or restoring some of its components (cf. “actual fact”). The determining, abolishing and confirming functions are simple ones. On the other hand, the modifying function is complex, consisting in simultaneous enrichment and depletion of meaning (cf. “the former minister”).

Stricto sensu connectors contain conjunctions which may occur either in a nominal context (e.g. “non-”) or in a propositional context (e.g. “no”, “or”, “if”).

The conjunction “non-” in the nominal context (e.g. “non-Greek”) performs a specific modifying function in relation to the meaning of its nominal element: the infinitive function namely. It changes the meaning of its argument so that the meaning of the whole context becomes identical with the meaning of a generic name (*genus proximum*) superior in relation to this element (here: the meaning of the name “man”), enriched with a presentation of the judgment refusing to the object of this name – the specific features of the object of the negated name (here: the name “Greek”). With all this, the rule of infinitation is in force, allowing the addition of “non” only to such names which are subordinate a certain name. This rule is violated by the expression “non-entity”, because for the word “entity” we can not establish a *genus*. Thus “non-entity” is a nonsense term. Therefore, if we considered the noun “nothing” as synonymous with the expression “a non-entity”, we would also consider “nothing” to be a nonsense term. In fact, “nothing” is a syncategorematic element of negative sentences: it is either a propositional connector or it may be the negation of an existential quantifier. The phrase “Nothing is eternal” therefore means the same as “There is no entity which would be eternal”.

As for conjunctions in propositional contexts, e.g. the conjunction “or”, they fulfil the modifying function in relation to sentences which are combined with the aid of them: these sentences do not represent in this context performed judgments but presented judgments, and a whole alternative sentence expresses the probability of these presented judgments. The degree of this probability remains in inverse proportion to the number of main elements of this context. A similar modifying function – at least in certain contexts – is fulfilled by the connective “if” in relation to sentences-elements (*scil.* predecessor and successor). The whole of such a context expresses the judgment that the logical relation of consequence occurs between the presented judgments. We are talking here about so-called formal (*scil.* logical) truths – i.e. the judgments considered consequences of the relevant reasons – that is the “truth” is opposed sometimes to material truths. However, if these “truths” are true, it is precisely in the same sense in which any materially true judgment is true. Thus, formal truths are a kind of material truths, i.e. judgments which state what is or deny what is not.

4.5. Ethics

Twardowski was a forerunner (anyway, in Poland) of the program of so-called independent ethics, i.e. an ethics free from ideological assumptions. Among the traditional ethical problems, he separated problems which, according to him, could be considered scientific. He claimed that the task of scientific ethics consisted in a description of the conditions in which the aspirations and actions of individual people and communities could be reconciled to the greatest extent.

4.5.1. Ethical absolutism. Just as in the theory of truth, he also presented in ethics a profound critique of axiological relativism and skepticism.

In support of ethical agnosticism, the following arguments were formulated, among others: (a) there are no absolutely obligatory ethical norms (*resp.* criteria);

(b) there are no commonly obligatory norms (at all times and in all societies); (c) the terms “good” and “bad” have different meanings in different times and places. According to Twardowski – these must be rejected because: (a) when we precisely formulate norms which are considered general judgments, they appear to be norms restricted to a certain domain; (b) the fact that, at certain times or in certain communities, certain norms are not obligatory, should be understood in such a way that either they are not (at that time or in these communities) recognized as obligatory, and they can be mistakenly recognized as such, or that they (despite the general formulation) do not apply *de facto* to all cases – i.e. they are not applicable in all of them; (c) the variability of notions does not imply the variability of norms.

Among the arguments in favor of ethical relativism, sometimes the consequences that the theory of evolution entails to ethics are mentioned. Twardowski – without ruling on the merits of the latter – carried out a detailed analysis of these alleged consequences.

He showed that the spread of the theory of evolution caused the appearance of the ethical conception, according to which ethical convictions were the result of natural selection. Moreover, some people began to regard as moral every, and only such, an action, which contributes to maintaining our own life and the survival of the species. This leads to changing ethical beliefs along with changing living conditions and, consequently, to – as it was called by Twardowski – “ethical anarchy”.

It is hard – Twardowski emphasized – not to acknowledge the fact that people differ in their assessments as to the validity of various things: in the assessments of ethical actions (performed “on the basis of conscience”), in aesthetic assessments (performed “on the basis of taste”), as well as in logical assessments, i.e. assessments of beliefs in terms of truth and falsehood (performed “on the basis of reason”). However, this does not imply that there are no generally obligatory norms in matters of conscience, taste and reason. Differences of opinions in these matters may have a source in the fact that we do not have a theory to order these matters satisfactorily.

These are not “moral truths” – as Twardowski termed them – developed in the course of evolution, but the development of humanity itself, improving in terms of “reason, conscience and aesthetic taste.”

4.5.2. Freedom of will. The question of free will is linked with determinism, when the freedom of will of X is recognized as a lack of causes for the decision-making acts (*scil.* resolutions) of X . The motives and personality of X (*scil.* the totality of X 's dispositions) could be such causes.

Twardowski was interested not in resolving the controversy of determinism-indeterminism – although he was convinced that determinism is the most probable of all possible positions in this issue. He wanted to determine whether determinism entails such ominous effects for ethics as anti-determinists sometimes thought. Twardowski's answer was negative: if resolutions had in fact causes-motives and

the personality of the acting person influenced them, then nothing stood in the way of assessing ethical actions just because of these motives and this personality. Because, generally speaking, “never and nowhere is the necessity of a certain phenomenon an obstacle to evaluating it”.

But the question arises as to whether X is responsible for the actions of X taken under the resolution of X , determined by the motives and personality of X . According to Twardowski, if a certain action of X is taken in such circumstances – that can be (as Twardowski used to say) “esteemed” as X ’s action, and therefore X is a perpetrator of this action – then X is responsible for this action to Y (if, in particular, Y has the right to obtain compensation): this action is his merit (if good) or his guilt (if bad), and therefore it is worthy of reward or punishment.

Twardowski thought that although the existence of free will was not necessary for moral improvement, for some people, believing (alternatively: instinctive believing) in its existence was needed. If the thesis of determinism was true, then the reason for the existence of practical ethics (*eo ipso* for formulating moral norms) could be that some people carried about “the positive value of resolutions”.

4.6. Aesthetics

In the field of aesthetics – Twardowski conducted, among other things, an analysis of two questions examined in the context of experimental, and therefore scientific aesthetics: the question of the criterion of beauty in art, and the question of how music is able to perform its evocative function.

Experimental aesthetics is practiced by a person, who verifies, with the aid of carefully selected experiments, hypotheses posed by aestheticians and concerning aesthetic assessments and preferences. One such hypothesis is that “only sizes of figures based on the line of the so-called golden ratio could be considered beautiful”. As has been shown by experimental research, this hypothesis – according to Twardowski – is verified by “aesthetically educated minds”, and is falsified by “aesthetically uneducated ones”.

Twardowski posed the question of how music evokes musical experiences in the audience. He answered that question as follows: pleasure arises as a result of listening to music (irrespective of any text to which it is associated), because: (a) this listening does not require any effort; (b) sounds of music themselves are “pleasant”; (c) listening to music, we have a “sense of both diversity and homogeneity of a certain number of impressions”. But a musical composition which is listened to also evokes experience with an analogical structure – with its own (melodic, rhythmic, chordal) structure.

5. Philosophical school

Twardowski conducted a *de facto* reorganization of the philosophical life in Lvov. He led to the origin of modern philosophical studies, to the establishment of various philosophical institutions – and he instilled in his students and all the people

affected by him – the love of truth and diligent work. He instilled in his pupils not so much individual ideas, but rather certain methodological assumptions.

In terms of philosophical and ideological beliefs, Twardowski's students differed very much: among them were ontological dualists and monists; axiological absolutists and relativists; opponents and proponents of multi-valued logic; conservatives and socialists; priests and atheists. What they shared was the above-mentioned precision in expressing thoughts and attention to properly justifying accepted theses – and, associated with those qualities, carefulness in solving problems and a critical attitude in relation to results: primarily one's own – but subsequently, also others.

The didactic activity of Twardowski had a lot of components.

First, he delivered cycles of so-called introductory lectures concerning in fact – successively – all the systematic disciplines of philosophy and the history of philosophy. Secondly, he had lessons for a narrower group of students, forming in them the ability of independent philosophical thinking. Thirdly, he delivered lectures to a wider audience: within the university, designed for all faculties – and outside the university, including non-academic groups. Fifthly, he participated in the discussions of the Philosophical Circle, existing at Lvov University before his arrival in Lvov, and then in the Polish Philosophical Society, created by him in 1904. Sixthly, the program to create a serious study of philosophy in Poland also involved creating the magazine *Philosophical Movement* (1911) and involving in the organization of the existing *Philosophical Review*.

Twardowski's program has brought great results. After World War I, Twardowski's School spread to other Polish philosophical centers: the Lvovian wing was, first of all, supplemented by Warsawian one. This happened because chairs of philosophy and logic in Warsaw were taken by some of the first generation of Twardowski's pupils. Thus it came to the formation of the Lvov-Warsaw School, the largest, most influential and most famous in the world – so far – Polish school of philosophy. It included philosophers of the caliber of Jan Łukasiewicz, Władysław Witwicki, Zygmunt Zawirski, Stefan Baley, Stanisław Leśniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Izydora Dąmbska.

The value of Twardowski's work is shown in the fact that at the time of his death – his immediate disciples held chairs in philosophical domains (and many of Twardowski's pupils also held chairs in other fields) at almost all of the Polish universities (i.e. in Warsaw, Poznań, Cracow, Lvov and Vilna).

6. Conclusions

The basis of Twardowski's philosophical views is a pluralistic conception of being, a bipolar conception of actions, an intentional conception of consciousness, a triadic conception of presentations, a presentative conception of images, as allogenic

conception of concepts, a constructivist conception of universals, a gradational conception of the accuracy of concepts, and an idiogenic conception of judgments.

These views form the metaphysical basis of his descriptive semiotics. This is an abstract theory of language phenomena, i.e. a system of definitions and their consequences – built with the method of logical analyses, preceded by an inventory and classification system supplementing these phenomena. The core of this theory is a psycho-physical conception of signs and a functional conception of expressions.

In semiotics, Twardowski is to be respected fourfold: as a critic of other people's conceptions, a creator of his own analyses, refinements and theses, a precursor of new ideas and methods, and an impeller of later polemics.

It was under Twardowski's influence that Jan Łukasiewicz became an anti-psychologist. As a result of his criticism of relativism, the classical theory of truth was adopted widely in Poland and became the background of the semantics of Alfred Tarski. Distinguishing content and the object of presentation in the form proposed by Twardowski has been assimilated and further established by Meinong. The criticism of idealism, based on these distinctions, was continued later, fruitfully, by Ajdukiewicz. The view that probability is possessed by presentations of judgments and not by judgments themselves, was taken over from Twardowski, i.a. by Łukasiewicz. Coming from Twardowski's idea of the relationship of action-product – as a relationship of causation different from causal connection – resulted in the future praxeology of Kotarbiński. The idea of examining objects as correlates of mental actions, i.e. as existentially neutral objects – was also present in the ontology of Meinong and in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl – and was revived later in Saul Kripke's semantics of possible worlds. The idea of images – as a possible underlying presentations of concepts – has allowed the extension of normal defining beyond the classic formula (*per genus*). The idea of concepts as presentations containing, i.a. presented judgments in its content – can be regarded as the announcement of a Russellian reduction of notions to propositional functions. The idea of presented judgment as a presentation of performed judgment resulted in the Ingardenian conception of quasi-judgments. The idea of a work of art as a product of an artist's actions, different from the material of these actions – was developed in detail by Roman Ingarden in his intentional aesthetics. In Twardowski, we should look for the prototypes of Czeżowski's method of analytical description and the Ajdukiewiczian method of semantic translation (of interpreted texts).

All this is enough to consider Twardowski as, not only an extraordinary teacher, but also an excellent scholar.

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